Sabbatean Messianism as Proto Secularism

M. Avrum Ehrlich

Introduction

This article tries to understand two aspects of the relationship
between Sabbateanism and secularism , the first is the influence of
the Donme; an organised Sabbatean group which converted to Islam out
of theological conviction which, it will be argued, underscored a
distinct “assimilation doctrine” and maintained a profound sympathy
for secularism. The second is the general influence of Sabbatean
doctrines and the extent to which it trickled down and permeated
strains within the mainstream Jewish mindset. These two are very
different, despite its secrecy the aforementioned group is an
organised cultural group while the latter is no such thing, it does
not credit Sabbateanism in any way and even tries to disguise its
Sabbatean influence. So proof must be sought through clues and
doctrinal similarities still extant within the thinking patterns of
suspected groups. Scholars such as Scholem and Katz undertook this and
we have them to thank for drawing the connection between Sabbateanism
and certain modern Jewish phenomena. This article takes on from
Scholem’s assertion and Katz’s follow-up that Sabbateanism, as an
anti-nomian religion , provided precedents and legitimacy to a Judaism
that did not necessarily keep all Jewish law and in doing so paved the
way to forms of ritually non-observant Judaism such as the Haskalla
and Zionism. In this paper we will concentrate, amongst other things,
on evidence of Sabbatean influence on the Young Turk revolution and on
Zionism.

We know the importance of ideas, and by extension of religion, in
galvanising people into networks and then into political action.
Human-kind seems to be ever-developing the sophistication of its
alliance networks and the way in which people, groups and nations
consolidate and make covenants. The Sabbatean network structure is
remarkable in many ways. Social networking in general serves as
nothing less than a barometer, albeit not always easy to read,
measuring degrees of social evolution. The process by which ideas move
and grow and are disseminated beyond their original breeding ground is
an area little researched. Sabbateanism is such a phenomena and is
allusive, tracing its long-term permeation is difficult. By which
media were the ideas of Sabbateanism transferred? How did Sabbateanism
transform? Did those people influenced by Sabbatean ideas work solely
within Jewish frameworks or at convenient opportunities break from
them to more lucrative ground leaving no trace of having existed? Are
Sabbateans always dreamy mystics (or perverts as portrayed in many
historical accounts) or are they social activists, revolutionaries,
liberals and people intuitively seeking moderation and a desire to
shrug off the yoke of restrictive religious governance? Was the
Sabbatean breakaway movement a deviation from the norm or an attempt
to reform and a catalyst for what later became the Jewish
Enlightenment? Are there still groups of people which show evidence or
signs of Sabbatean influence? Whether this area of research can be
understood in much the same way as the study of the empirical sciences
and the study of, say - energy, which never dissipates but only
changes form, depends on our ability to trace and document its
transformations. How we trace a collection of religious ideas embodied
in a particular group as they spread or are transformed, disseminate
or become desirable to other civilisations is not yet a science. Some
of these questions are addressed in the following study. Sabbateanism
is an example in point, being strategically positioned to be the
carrier of new ideas. It was, however, less able to survive as an
intact group over the furies of history, leaving us primarily with an
important doctrinal heritage sweeping through and affecting both
Jewish and wider society. The story of the Donme only partly depicts
the extent of Sabbatean influence.

Key Terms

It is appropriate to make a few general comments and establish working
definitions of the major subjects discussed here.

Sabbateanism developed to explain the teachings and actions of Sabetay
Sevi (Shabbtai Zvi), who declared his messiaship in 1666 and soon
afterwards allegedly converted to Islam, leaving a large and far-flung
flock in the Ottoman Empire and beyond very confused. He and his
followers combined the study of Lurianic Kabbalah with overt
messianism and a unique relationship with the Ottoman Empire. The
aberration of Jewish law as taught by his disciples was justified with
mystical rationale as an important step in the messianic redemption.
Thus disobedience to Jewish religious law became acceptable and even
encouraged in the sect while purporting o have a desire for holiness,
and a belief in God and the Messiah. Abandoning tradition seemed to
legitimise and even encourages assimilatory thinking as a religious
tenet, something which had been strongly condemned by the rabbinic
leadership till that time. Sabbateanism witnessed a group of Sevi’s
adherents converting to Islam (known as the Donme) but other forms
converted to Catholicism (Frankism) and it is considered likely that
other arguably assimilatory efforts (such as Haskalla, Reform, Secular
Zionism ) were either inspired by Sabbatean doctrine or underwent the
same processes that led to its development. Assimilation seems to be a
common thread amongst these groups. For many believers who rejected
Sabetay Sevi’s messiahship after his apostasy, the issues he extolled
nevertheless still remained relevant. They were ideas that had been
repressed by the traditional leadership but had been given credibility
by the Sabbatean movement, and even though it took on extreme
expression by Sevi’s conversion to Islam, the ideas remained intact.
Had Sevi and his followers not taken such extreme measures the ideas
expressed would never have reached a critical mass, but clearly there
existed pent-up feelings and dissatisfaction in Jewish life which
needed to be vented and it fell on these events to bring them to the
fore. Indeed, many Jews wished to remain loyal to their religious,
traditional, family and emotional heritage but also had reservations
about their lives under existing conditions. The all-permeating legal
demands of ritual Jewish law (halakhah) were stifling, the introverted
stance of the Jewish community and its fear of engaging the wider
society did not suit the ambitious nature of many Jews. The lack of a
living Hebrew culture and the absence of Jewish national symbols and
the sense that Jews were not able to entirely share the pride and
empathy of other Turks in the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire was
frustrating. Many sought a way to integrate into the larger society
and sought a national identity while not giving up their essential
Jewish belief systems and the culture dear to them. Sabbateanism
emerged to provide doctrinal solutions for these people. The doctrines
emerging did not remain the heritage of a closed group. While the
“assimilation doctrine” was not always conducive to group building, it
was an important enough idea to proliferate and it did so leaving few
traceable links to its Sabbatean source .

The Donme are the descendents of a small group of people who,
emulating Sabetay Sevi, converted to Islam. Some will argue, amongst
them members of modern day Donme communities in Turkey, that they had
been forced to convert to Islam like their leader had and the
theological conviction in support of the conversion developed only
afterwards . The term “Donme” is Turkish for an insincere conversion
to Islam – apostate . The Donme community combined many Jewish
practices in private while demonstrating Islamic practices in public.
Although enclothed in religious doctrine, the essential direction of
the theology was towards assimilation. Interestingly, this idea still
possesses religious significance. Nevertheless, it is likely that
conversion to Islam had practical motives also; those seeking tax
havens and better economic treatment, sought to join the Donme
community and be recognised as Muslims, in this way they could, on the
one hand, remain Jewish at heart, and on the other hand, enjoy tax
benefits reserved to Muslims. It is also likely that those who had
converted to Islam for pragmatic reasons prior to Sevi’s mystical
apostasy later joined Donme communities feeling more comfortable there
than in a purely Islamic environment. In many respects this resembled
(or inspired) a later declaration by Moses Mendelsohn to be a “Jew in
the home and a German in the street”, or rather in this earlier
context “to be a Muslim on the street and a Jew in private”. The Donme
became a home for assimilated Jews, much like the modern phenomena of
mixed Jewish-Gentile couples joining Reform Temples because they are
accepted there and are not in Orthodox communities. The influences of
Sabbateanism can be detected in Mendelsohn’s sentiments and within the
highly assimilatory program of the Enlightenment. But overt rejection
of tradition would have been impossible in the strongly traditional
structures of the 17th century and therefore the Donme intuitively
garbed their ideas with religious/doctrinal overtones and in elaborate
rituals and symbolism at least until the onset of public secularism
permitted its essential nature to become public.

The Donme are notoriously secretive, this becoming a major tenet of
their doctrine. This was likely because of fear of the Ottoman
authorities and because they wished to preserve the many benefits they
enjoyed as Muslims while knowing they were not entirely Muslim in
practice. Without a doubt they also feared the criticism and the
vengeance of Jewish orthodoxy which might try to spoil their situation
if too much be known. Converting to Islam offered a way to break out
of the millet community structure forced on minority communities by
the Sultan .

Under such a system the Jewish religious leadership of the Empire –
the “Haham Basi” appointed rabbinic leaders, collected tax, decided
community policy and religious law and meted out justice. However
disagreeable his religious decisions were for minority Jewish groups,
all were required to abide by its policy. By conversion to Islam,
however, one would no longer be required to heed the Jewish hierarchy
and could more easily form independent community structures. Clearly,
motives existed for their conversion; to be relieved from religious
tyranny and also to become a part of a broad thinking and aspiring
Empire.

The alleged sexual promiscuity of the Donme, along with other rituals
believed to be practised by them, is in itself a fascinating study.
Whether true or false? Whether part of an image which rabbinism
created to delegitimise a schismatic sect, or in some way true and
having some ideological merit within Sabbateanism, is still unclear.
Many Donme insist that rumours of orgies on the “feast of the lamb”
are baseless while some scholars argue that they were once in practice
amongst more doctrinally observant Donme . Myth or fact these alleged
rituals make for fascinating imagery. The “feast of the lambs” for
example contains symbols and subliminal ideology. Least among them is
an early exploration of women’s egalitarianism, arguably paving the
way for equality of the sexes in their community in contrast to the
conservatism of other Muslim groups in Turkey . If true, it would
certainly have forced them into isolation from other Jews and
consequently to a greater dependence on each other, if for no other
reason than because their offspring were suspected of being ‘bastards’
(mamzerim) in rabbinic terms and only people of the same legal status
were permitted to marry with them . On the other hand we may argue
that these rumours were perpetuated as a rabbinic method to ensure
that other Jews did not marry them. Unable to deny them their status
as Jews, the rabbinic leadership denied them their rights to marry
with other Jews, basing this on suspicions of sexual promiscuity and
thereby providing a perfectly sound legal platform for their
excommunication.

The Donme answered to various names such as “Maaminim” (Hebrew for
‘believers’), “Avdeti” (Arabic for ‘heretics’), “Selanikli” (from
Salonika), and Sabetayci (Sabbetay). By the 19th century three strains
of Donme had emerged, each with their own distinct classes and its
kahal/synagogues and they were particularly represented in the Donme
stronghold of Salonica.
1. Izmirim, (otherwise known as Kapanci) were the original followers
of Sabetay Sevi, named after his home-town of Izmir. The Izmiris were
successful in trade and prominent in the intelligentsia – they formed
the aristocracy of Donme society under the name “Cavelleros”, they
were highly assimilated into Ottoman society and spoke Turkish.
2. The Yakoviyim, followed Sevi’s brother Jacob believing him to be
his incarnation. They were represented in lower and middle classes of
Ottoman society and were commonly bureaucrats in Ottoman government.
3. The Konyoses, (otherwise known as Karakash) followed one of Sevi’s
disciples Baruchia Russo believing him to be his incarnation. They
were the poorest of the Donme, spoke Judeo-Spanish and were generally
artisans and workers. A part of this group are believed to still
practise religious rites in modern Turkey and are known as fanatical
fundamentalists by the rest of the Donme.

If we interpret the Donme conversion to Islam not so much as an
embrace of Islamic religious doctrine but as the desire to assimilate
into the dominant society, then we may assume that with the easing of
Islamic norms in modern Turkey, the Donme would not fight to remain
loyal to Islam but rather adopt new practices. And although Islam does
not permit the interrogation of converts and was required to accept
them without question, the Donme were traditionally suspected of
lacking conviction. This suspicion proved justified, as demonstrated
by the ease with which Donme slipped into secularism after the
Tanzimat reforms introduced by foreign pressures around the 1840s.
Taxation of minorities was eased and conversion out of Islam was
permitted, signalling a process of secularisation and unprecedented
levels of tolerance for other worldviews on a de jure basis .
Evangelical Christian groups became more active in the empire and some
even exerted their strong influence on Sabbateanism, which combined
Christian influences of the inquisition and influences of British
millenarians making headway in the Ottoman Empire . The Donme
community certainly felt less obliged to observe strict Islam and at
liberty to pursue greater assimilation into an even broader system,
while the reforms allowed many to return to Judaism. By that time Jews
were also seeking broader cultural and ideological paradigms and a
return to earlier forms sectarianism was unnecessary. Religion was no
longer the predominant superstructure for society but rather a
component of it; they and others identified the umbrella structure of
nationalism and tolerant secular government to be the preferred
paradigm permitting diverse practices and culture. It became obvious
that conversion to Christianity was also not as progressive as the
embrace of secularism and nationalism.

The greatest change for the Donme community occurred during the Balkan
wars when Salonica passed over to Greek hands. At this point many
Donme resettled in Turkish Istanbul and set up schools and communities
which have left a mark on Turkish society till today. However, the
forced transfer of Turks from Salonica to Turkey in 1924 was the final
blow to the Donme stronghold and changed the course of Donme history.
While many attempted a rapprochement with the Jewish community that
would allow them to remain in Salonica as Jews not as Turks, their
efforts were rejected. Rabbinic refusal to accept them back remarkably
saved them from extinction along with the rest of Salonican Jewry
during the Nazi occupation of Greece. Other Donme are alleged to have
converted to Christianity so as to remain in Salonica but the Greek
public opinion viewed the Donme as more harmful than other Turks and
sought their absolute expulsion. It is therefore unclear to what
extent conversion to Christianity helped them and to what extent those
that remained were saved from destruction under the Nazi occupation .
From the 1940s there began a strong assimilatory trend amothe Donme
who resettled in Turkey. Efforts to preserve their secrecy were
intensified, probably resulting from having witnessed the destruction
of Greek Jewry and fear that the same could happen to them in the wake
of Turkish co-operation with the Nazi regime. Fear of growing Islamic
antagonism to the perceived Donme role in the overthrow of the Sultan
and establishment of a secular State in Turkey further forced Donme
affiliates to underplay their prominence and community network.

Though the Donme were never officially deemed to be a separate group
there were signs that this might change when the 1960 Census
registered them as a distinct group, primarily for taxation purposes.
At the time it was believed that approximately 20,000 Donme members
existed in Turkey. Some estimate their numbers to be around
50,000-60,000 today, others estimate it at 100,000. They are believed
to be very prosperous but highly assimilated, with only a small
minority being Sabbatean in the religious sense. They generally refer
to themselves as “Salonicans” not as Sabbateans. They are extremely
non-religious. The enmity of Islamic fundamentalism towards them is
one of the strongest factors in the preservation of their distinct
ethnic memory. Because of the high intermarriage rate the phenomenon
of half-Donme is becoming increasingly well known. There have been
recent efforts by partisan Donme activists to reclaim their national
pride and standing in Turkish society but this has met with overall
rejection, embarrassment and denial from the mainstream Donme
population.

The Ottoman Empire lasted from 1299 to1920 and as it grew embraced
different religions and cultures under its sovereignty. Ottomans had a
long history of tolerance, and an open door policy for Jews from Spain
and later from Russia. To accommodate them and other groups it
developed the Quranic concept of the dhimmi to ensure the development
of a method of Islamic rule, which was tolerant to different cultures.
It translated into a system of minority administrations known as the
millet system, whereby religious groups could rule their own people
with minimal interference, while ensuring Ottoman hegemony and
efficient tax collection. This system was partially successful but
also left much dissatisfaction. Perhaps Sabbateanism was a form of
Jewish protest against corruption of mainstream millet leadership –
which was invariably controlled by the rabbinate. Perhaps the millet
system ordained by the Sultan to facilitate the orderly control of
minority religions bolstered an intolerant local leadership that
ignored pluralism and subtleties of religious sub-groups, causing them
to be stifled to such a degree that it made conversion to Islam one of
the preferable remedies.

The environment in the Ottoman Empire was fertile ground in which a
cross-religious movement such as Sabbateanism could sprout. The Empire
was also home to Bektashism, another highly tolerant, cross-religious
form of Sufi Islam which maintained particular ties to Ottomanism and
also had strong ties with the Donme. These mystically oriented groups
seemed to be exploring new patterns of religious and social
integration. The Donme proved to be instrumental in the success of the
Young Turk revolution and the formation of the secular state, while
the Bektashi, for their own reasons, opposed the Young Turk
revolution.

Mysticism

Despite its other characteristics, it may be argued that mysticism is
in some ways a form of proto-secularism, exactly because of its
mystical nature. Centuries before secularism came into existence as a
concept unto itself, various social forces were conspiring to produce
its seminal form. Mystics are often more interpretive of texts, allow
more room for scope and tolerance, and differ from the conservative
norm, being less rigid in the obedience of religious laws, more
accepting of peoples believing that unity exists on a profounder
level. The anti-nomian nature of Sabbateanism rejects the traditional
Jewish ritual as antiquated while it embraces what was believed to be
a more universal – messianic – goal, which later evolved into the
tenets of secularism and democracy.

Despite the perception that mystics associate with rigid or
fundamental sects, it seems that the doctrinal structures of some such
groups are often more liberal than superficially thought to be. The
liberal ideas and goals at the heart of such a group’s thinking are
perceived by members to be under so great an attack from intolerant
elements, that great efforts were taken to ensure their preservation.
Rituals and rules of entry into the group were enforced. Hence groups
that could well have advocated proto-liberal ideas developed rituals
and rigours to protect themselves which, over time, became an integral
part of the group identity and were not eased when the ideas they
propagated became more tolerated or even became the norm. Hence
mysticism must be viewed carefully, appreciating both its religious
affiliations as well as the radical approaches that it often
introduced into societies still not ready to embrace them.

Mystical Messianism of the Jewish strain commonly draws its doctrinal
principles from Lurianic Kabbalah, which teaches a doctrinal system
where individuals, by virtue of their own – independent - spiritual
efforts combine to redeem humanity. This idea is messianic in that its
final goal is the redemption of mankind, but it suffices with mystical
and ritualistic efforts and does not require practical means or effort
within political systems to achieve its goals. This form of messianism
appears to have become popular after efforts at political messianism
failed and the political circumstances for redemption were continually
not forthcoming . A sense of hopelessness drove the Jewish masses that
embraced kabbalistic teachings to find their redemption in a system
that would no longer disappoint them. In general mysticism’s ambiguity
lends itself to extreme degrees of interpretation and therefore
flexibility, which we shall see lends itself to what later developed
as “secularism”.

Political Messianism on the other hand is a set of political/utopian
ideas drawing on classic Biblical aspirations to physically and
literally rebuild Zion/the Jewish State and the Temple. In its
religious context this required the establishment of the Sanhedrin and
the rule of Biblical and religious law. This worldview was championed
by Maimonides who saw it as a rational/ political process, providing
Jews with a homeland from where they could develop and refine their
religious service. In today’s context this is a fundamentalist
approach that advocates a dangerously theocratic government but
contextualised to the Middle Ages it represented a rational and
political approach to religion and governance. The last efforts in
this direction were undertaken in 16th century Safed, where the
attempt to restore the ordination of what they believed would be
authentic, Biblically sanctioned leaders who had the authority to
renew the Sanhedrin was attempted and ultimately failed. This
“political messianic” effort lasted approximately one hundred years.
Its eventual failure arguably bolstered the mystical form of
messianism described above and eventually fuelled Sabbatean messianism
which in many ways combines both mystical and political elements.

Zionism is described by many to be a form of messianism so far as it
reflects the Jewish aspirations for Jewish governance in the Jewish
Homeland. But it had a distinct assimilationist theme, not so much on
a personal level but on a national scale- aspiring to be like the
other nations and to ‘normalise’ the Jewish people from an abnormal
Exile. While clearly Zionism evolved from messianic sentiments it was
not motivated out of strict religious doctrine, but the common
characteristics shared with earlier types of messianic efforts cannot
be ignored. It may fit into the general label of “political
messianism” but because its chief proponents were highly secular in
outlook, perhaps there were Sabbatean or anti-nomian messianic
influences on it as well.

Tracing the Course of Messianic Doctrine

Indeed the general studyof messianism is fascinating, it has often
provided the fodder, if not the motivation for much revolutionary
activity. While maintaining certain distinct characteristics it has
nevertheless transformed and developed various strains, rapidly
becoming useful to the political dynamics in different parts of the
world. It is therefore argued in this work that messianism carried
important social ingredients, which for reasons described below, were
deemed useful in the march for human self-perpetuation and in time
adapted itself within a broaderfraeven beyond of its original form.
The most documented occasion apparent is the proliferation of
Christianity (Greek for messianism). Not coincidentally, messianism
possessed characteristics and doctrines palatable to Rome, no doubt
providing the impetus for its meteoric expansion. In addition,
messianic feelings lent themselves to interpretation and a high degree
of ambiguity. Their potentially anti-nomian character was especially
important and is discussed below. The national interests of the
Ottoman Empire were similar to those of Rome and equally well served
by messianic doctrines. While the reasons that the Sabbatean
experience was not as successful as the Christian messianic experience
is not addressed here, the doctrinal mechanisms of Sabbateanism are
the same as found in the former and are continually found in later
political-religious phenomena, even in secular structures.

A mechanism was necessary to bring conquered territory and its peoples
under the wings of the Ottoman Empire, thus neutralising opposition
traditionally anchored in religious antagonism. So that a strong
nation may emerge it was essential that Ottoman Islam develop a
universal identity, incorporating the Empire’s many fragments into a
broad national alliance. Because it crossed the borders of religious
affiliations, a superstructure was required that on the one hand
embraced these differences, while on the other hand was still giving
deference to the existing Islamic sentiments at the hub of Ottoman
society. If we take the above-mentioned as our premise then the Donme
appear to be an ideal group serving this assimilatory purpose. If it
had not emerged on its own it would have needed to be created.

Components of Religion

Considering that institutionalised messianic doctrines lay at the core
of both Christianity and Islamic religions, it seems unnecessary to
suggest that another form of messianism could resolve these cultural
tensions, unless accompanied by unique insights and novelty specific
to Sabbatean messianism. Indeed, the popularity of messianism was so
widespread that it seems to be indistinguishable from the body of
monotheistic faith. Judaism, Christianity and Islam are more united in
the faith in a messianic time than they are about any other subject,
including the doctrine of God. To be sure, there are differences in
the exact formula of the messianic faith, the personality who embodies
the messianic figure and the leadership structure that serves as
caretaker until the messianic time arrived. Despite the differences,
there exists a distinct uniformity, indicating a combination of
fundamental ideas constituting an essential messianic idea. While they
may be added to or subtracted from in varying degrees to suit a
country, group or religion’s specific nature, there appears to be a
set of closely related ideas. They have proven themselves to be a
winning formula for popular appeal, agitating or uniting,
consolidating and motivating masses of people, resonating amongst
different groups while transcending opposing religious identities. In
fact, it may be argued that religious hegemony was so successful for
millennia, not because of an unquestioning respect that the masses
held for ecclesiastical law in its own right, but because the
religious/ruling establishment was, very early on, able to align
itself and rapidly forge a strong and indelible alliance with these
messianic proponents in society. While the wedding between these two
camps is arguably unnatural, it was mutually complementary. Clerical
leaders could proliferate ecclesiastical rule and their own power base
by harnessing their strategic allies’ populist enthusiasm and
interpreting it into an orderly code of living – at least until the
messiah came; while on the other hand the messianic proponents were
given mainstream credibility by the ecclesiastic camp. It was licensed
to permeate within a larger society, and endowed with a structure and
orderly caretaker hierarchy that could ensure the perpetuation of
messianic ideas, even during periods of dulled messianic passion.
Messianic elements thus ensured its caretaker governance and the
preservation of its ideas, even though by doing so many of its
principal ideas were undermined. Whether this alliance was made
consciously or intuitively is of secondary importance, the ability
however to identify the seams of this covenant, allows us to
extrapolate that the messianic idea is a highly conductive social
structure that lent itself to other – and alternative - unions. When
the opportunity availed, messianic doctrine would attach itself to
another emergent ruling body, in the modern case – to secularism. And
this is why it may be argued that messianic elements have aligned
themselves with secular governance. It is therefore not surprising to
see many forms of secular messianic movements today, included among
them various strains of Zionism.

Bektashi (Bektaşi) – Dönme Similarities

Ties between Sabbatean Kabbalah and esoteric Sufi Islam go back to the
days of Sabetay Sevi. Schwartz goes so far as to suggest that Sabetay
Sevi had participated in Bektashi rituals before his messianic
declarations and imported into Judaism a “millenial, Shia influence”
and that he had maintained his ties with the Bektashi, participating
in their rituals . This is based on his contention that Sevi’s exile
to the Balkans brought him into close contact with Bektashism. He
suggests that the Bektashi Sufists strongly influenced Sabbatean
behaviour and produces evidence of Bektashi worship at Sevi’s grave .
That there existed a strong connection between the Bektashi of
Salonica and the largest Donme community that lived there has been
established by Rosanes. The Donme of Salonica found common ground with
the Bektashi who shared many characteristics of Sabbateanism, or as
Schwartz would have it, strongly influenced Donme practice . Schwartz
notes some unique similarities between Donme and Bektashi practice
including alleged deliberate violation of kashrut/halal, alleged group
sex, ecstatic singing, mystical interpretations and belief in an
occult reading of Torah/Qur’an, as well as the practice of collective
cooked meals. There was also emphasis on the equality of women and
openness to all the monotheistic faiths with a strong heterodox and
almost anarchist nature as well as a unique multi-religious outlook,
viewing all the monotheistic religions as one. There has been little
evidence of anti-Semitism in Albanian history and few instances of
collaboration with the Nazis to kill their Jews. Schwartz also asserts
that Sevi became anti-nomian under Bektashi influence and was
protected by the Bektashis after his conversion, who sent him to
Albania where they were most powerful. Clearly this viewpoint is
unduly influenced by Schwartz’s Bektashi sympathies. Nevertheless the
strong affinity between the groups seems evident and one might agree
that Sabbateanism and Bektashiism were inspired by similar
circumstances, responding to the thirst for liberalism and the surging
need to find cross-denominational paradigms to complement the Empire’s
imperialism and express the collective identity volving amongst its
citizens. Bektashiism was an Ottoman phenomenon with most of its
rituals and prayers based on poems and songs in the Turkish language
and in this respect it testifies to the assertion that various
religious structures were emerging tailored to the requirements of
imperial Ottomanism.

Some Reasons for the Emergence of Sabbateanism

A student of Jewish mysticism in general and Lurianic Kabbalah in
particular, Sabetay Sevi declared his messiain the year 1666 and
gained a popular following in the Ottoman Empire and beyond, far
exceeding the size and diversity that other messianic groups had
achieved till that point in Jewish history. Much has been written on
the subject, but for present purposes it suffices to summarise some
essential ideas associated with Sabbateanism that led to its
proliferation.

They include: the abolition of many religious laws specific to the
exilic nature of Jewish practice and the dismissal of melancholic and
mournful habits commemorating the defeat of national Jewish life .
Hence fast days were abolished and the motto of “permitting the
forbidden” gained currency. Sexual liberation, breaking with
traditional leadership, rejection of contemporary community structures
and the embracing universal ideas followed. The movement embraced
Ottoman culture by converting to Islam and assimilating into the
Empire as equal citizens. Yet these ideas, including the most liberal,
were still distinctively engarbed in religious and mystical doctrines
and language with the requisite attendance to the theme of the
national renaissance of the Jewish people - the messianic redemption.
However, we can nevertheless determine, with the advantage of
hindsight, that these were early expressions of liberal ideals.

Gershom Scholem tried to answer the question why, from the many tens
of messianic sects emerging and then fizzling out amongst Jewish
communities, the messiahship of Sabetay Sevi did not remain a local
phenomenon but reverberated for many centuries to follow and spread so
widely throughout the Jewish world. In his analysis Scholem attributed
the cause primarily to the role played by the students of Jewish
mysticism living in 16th century Safed. Safed was home to many Jewish
immigrants from all over the Jewish world, including Sephardic Jews
and those from neighbouring Damascus and Egypt as well as from Russia,
Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Most interesting were those Spanish and
Portuguese Jews exiled after the expulsion of 1492 and the communities
of Marrano Jews returning to Judaism, some making their way to Safed
and Jerusalem.

The diverse nature and input of these people into the Safed community
was in itself unprecedented in the previous thousand years previous
and perhaps it was this that contributed to two fascinating phenomena
occurring there within the space of 50 years. The first was the
attempt by Rabbi Jacob Berab and his school to renew the Sanhedrin
(political messianism) and the second was the rapid development of
Kabbalistic teaching and its dissemination (mystical messianism).

Scholem argues that the diverse backgrounds of these scholars and
their need to raise funds to sustain the community of scholars
necessitated the sending of ambassadors to their respective diaspora
communities. These ambassadors were scholars and travelled and taught
the unique Kabbalistic worldview they had learned in Safed and in this
way served as a conduit for the dissemination of Lurianic Kabbalah and
caused its rapid proliferation throughout the Jewish world. He
continues that these teachings formed the basis of Sabbateanism and
fostered messianic tensions. Sabetay Sevi, himself a scholar of
Lurianic Kabbalah along with Natan of Gaza were easily able to tap
into a new and vibrant religious system that waited to be harnessed by
a personal Messiah. Lurianic Kabbalah presented to the Jewish world
the image of Jewish suffering and redemption in a different light to
what was previously taught by the strict worldview of the rabbis and
halakhism. Kabbalistic interpretation allowed for great scope, its
commentary on religious texts was often entirely re-interpretive, it
presumed an active human role in the dynamics of God which made human
activity holy in itself. It recognised an essential unity of all
things in the infinity of God that enabled a tolerance for superficial
differences in the material world. These remained mystical doctrines
in isolated Safed but would future, become useful political tools
professing ethnic and religious tolerance in the Ottoman Empire. The
teachings were finding their way to that Empire and would become
politically activated with Sevi’s messianic declaration.

Sabbatean Evolution

Sabbateanism developed in the atmosphere of defeat that the Ottomans
suffered at the gates of Vienna in 1683. It is likely that the
atmosphere in the Empire affected the growth of the movement. The
Sultans quickly understood that if the Empire did not adopt Western
techniques and adopt the best of French engineering, medicine and
science they would continue to lose wars. But it was more than a
century and a half later that Sultans like Mahmut II in 1826 started
movements to openly adopt Western culture. In 1839 Sultan Abdul Mecid
extended equal citizenship to all the citizens of the Empire, without
religious or ethnic distinction ensuring that all citizens could bear
witness in court even against a Muslim, could hold government office
and serve in the high ranks of the army. The Donme were important
beneficiaries of this process, growing and enjoying swift assimilation
into Ottoman life.

On the other front, the relationship of the Donme to the Jews was
tense. Their need to defend themselves from religious Jewish polemic
inspired the rapid spread of print, the encouraging of scholarship and
the continued study of Jewish mysticism and theological literature. At
the same time, the Jewish religious authorities banned the study of
mysticism and repressed Sabbatean influence while turning inwards.
Some attribute the decline of Ottoman Jewry to the crisis born in the
wake of Sabetay Sevi’s messianic claims and apostasy. Sabbatean -
messianic expectations are believed to have neautralised the
entrepreneurial spirit of many believers who expected to be magically
whisked away from exile to redemption. This view does not accurately
depict the sociological structures of messianic groups and is unlikely
to be the entire cause for the economic degeneration of Ottoman Jewry.
On the contrary, communities of believers and minority sects are often
able to develop strong networks and loyalties allowing them to
strengthen their economic activity. Further, contrary to common
thinking that messianics are dreamy-eyed and unworldly, messianic
beliefs are often rooted in strong cultural and social networks and
provide both an excellent infrastructure and motivation for commerce .
This was the case with the Donme. Perhaps the mainstream Jewish
communities, which were influenced by Sabbatean thinking but remained
under rabbinic leadership, went through a greater crisis as they were
required to go to great lengths to weed out the potentially heretical
elements still active in their midst.

It is this process which was damaging for Ottoman Jewry. The efforts
to censor certain religious and kabbalistic texts is well documented,
the oppression of the imaginative faculties, freedom and creativity of
the community members left its mark on Ottoman Jewry . Ties with
undesireable elements were cut, suspicions and paranoia raged against
those who were believed to be secret Sabbateans and the community
turned inwards, leaving a sense of depression amongst the Ottoman
Jewish communities. In the meantime other minorities of the Empire
became more adept in their commercial dealings and were helped by
their religious structures particularly the Greek Orthodox church and
the Armenian Orthodox structures. The Donme who converted to Islam,
now free of the Jewish millet control over their activities, quickly
emerged as an important and functional community in the wider society.
The repressed Jewish communities were probably relieved to find
alternatives to their oppressive leadership in secularism and so,
indirectly, the oppression brought on by rabbinic reactions to
Sabbateanism also influenced the Jewish support for the Young Turk
revolution.

In a fascinating instance of a Jewish class conflict in the 1840s
Izmir, the poorer Jews reacted to the extortion of the wealthy meat
merchants who charged them high meat taxes first by embargoing them
and finally by eating non-kosher meat. A more extreme actwas the mass
conversion of 80 families to Protestantism and the preparedness of
another 2000 to do the same, so as to avoid the millet authority of
the Jewish leadership and its taxes and oppression. While no overt
mention of Sabbateanism is found, it seems more than coincidental that
this occurred in Sabetay Sevi’s home town, that the consumption of
non-kosher meat was a Sabbatean practice ; that so many people were
willing to convert out of Judaism is almost Sabbatean/Frankist in
style . One might view this as a testament to the effects and
influences that Sabbateanism was having on the Jewish communities and
how it legitimised the breaking with ritual law and endorassimilation
for motives of personal benefit. Even though the Jewish community
broke with overt Sabbateanism, precedents were set and the
infrastructure was placed for Jews to exit the observance of ritual
law. This correlated with its freedom from the often oppressive
practices of the religious leadership and was reinforced by the
success of the Donme communities in the general society and their
gradual re-acceptance by mainstream Jewish elements.

In contrast to the repression of religious freedom in places like
Italy and Ashkenaz, Benayahu argues that the Salonican Jewish
community did not take part in the repression of study and printing of
kabbalistic texts . It seems no coincidence that Salonikan Jews were
highly active and intellectual, successful and quite secular. The
vitality of the print industry that was long active there might have
later helped the Young Turks. It may be argued that the tolerance for
mystical teachings in Salonica prompted the willingness for far
reaching exercises in textual interpretation and imaginative exploits
and was accompanied by a dislike for rigid fundamentalism .

By the 19th century the Jewish communities were strong after a period
of lull. Jewish relations with the Donme, particularly in Ottoman
Salonica were friendly; the community distinctions were even blurred.
Critics might not have differentiated between the groups thus when
someone was suspected of being Jewish it is as likely that they were
Donme. The extent that Sabbatean doctrine and influence specifically
permeated the Jewish (non-Donme) community is unclear, as there
existed no overt structures for these ideas. However, the more
universal attitudes of the Jews and their embrace of Turkish life
might testify to remnants of attitudes espoused in Sabbateanism. Both
communities were strongly represented in the political and economic
life of Salonica .

Jacob Berab, Political Messianism and the Impetus for Sabbateanism

Finally; there was another reason for the proliferation of
Sabbateanism and the reasons why Lurianic Kabbalah was so geared to
Sabbatean messianic feelings. The little-researched events in Safed
surrounding the attempted renewal of the semikhah and the
re-establishment of the Sanhedrin in the year 1538 reflected messianic
aspirations of a more rational/political kind. Jacob Berab and his
followers, including the renowned halakhist Joseph Karo and others who
later became staunch students of Lurianic Kabbalah, supported these
political moves to inspire a Jewish religious enlightenment in the
Holy Land and establishing a supreme religious authority to interpret
halakhah according to their needs . The appointment of ordained
leadership and the efforts to develop a worldview to complement this
renaissance eventually failed to attract a critical mass. This failure
is often attributed to the objections raised by opponents whose
primary contentions were halakhic minutiae and the preservation of
certain religious status quos . With its failure, it became evident
that the halakhah, a system designed to preserve Judaism and the will
of God through His Law, was ironically preventing the nation’s
promised and long yearned-for renaissance. Many of the initial forces
at work in the renewal of the Sanhedrin subsequently took solace in an
abstract-mythical form or redemption, found in Kabbalah and
extrapolated by Isaac Luria’s system. This, in turn went full circle
to fuel the Sabbatean messianism that combined elements of both
systems in the following century. Sabbateanism understood that the
halakhah had to be broken for the redemptive process to begin and so
obviously anti-halakhic sentiments became a centrepiece of its ritual.
Yet the anti-nomian theology that subsequently developed still had as
its objective the same process of messianic renewal that its political
counterpart under Berab sought a hundred years earlier. There are some
who blame the rabbinic elements who undermined Berab’s efforts with
responsibility for “Sabbatean, Frankist and Mendelsohn’s heresy”. They
tried to stop the Sanhedrin initiative because they feared it would
lead to minor incursions of Jewish law. In their zeal to prevent the
implementation of a political messianic structure in the form of the
Sanhedrin initiative, it is argued that they paved the way for what
became an extreme and open-ended violation of Jewish Law with mystical
messianism and other anti-nomian ideologies. This view is polemical
but it does testify to the unstoppable train of progress that could
have taken a different turn under more astute leadership. Obsession
with halakhic nuances had caused the population to openly break with
halakhah .

Sabbateanism developed a resistance to the forces that had stopped its
predecessor; it would not be tripped up by internal paradoxes raised
by the demands of halakhic observance. Quite the opposite, a system
that recognised the need to openly break halakhah seemed to be the
only way to begin the redemptive process, and the way that this could
be sanctioned in a predominantly religious and believing society was
through the appeal of mysticism and communion with God as the higher
calling even greater than the Law. But the final stroke against the
halakhists who sought to halt the spirit of nationalism and
renaissance through their restrictive legalisms, was the declaration
that the messiah had arrived and in doing so legitimately contending
that the era of classic halakhah had come to an end. Tradition
recognised that the law would change and even be annulled in messianic
times. Declarations of his arrival legitimised for many - till then
halakhic observers - that the annulment of restrictive laws was now
possible .

The difference between the political messianists who sought to
re-institute the Sanhedrin and those who declared that the messiah
Sabetay had arrived was one motivated by necessity. Over time halakhic
forces had aligned themselves with conservatism and did not allow the
adaptation or the embracing of new ideas. The followers of Berab were
the last of the rational messianics to try and work within the
halakhic process. Had they succeeded, many halakhic rigours would most
likely have been eased, but their failure brought on a second, more
rigorous challenge in the form of Sabbateanism and a mass movement to
annul halakhic observance altogether.

It was not co-incidental that these events paralleled the height of
the Ottoman Empire (and perhaps the beginning of its decline). Both
the politico-messianic events amongst the Safed sanhedrinists and the
mystic-messianic development of Sabbateanism occurred under Ottoman
rule and in many ways reflected the nationalism and vision extant in
Ottoman culture. Failure of the sanhedrinists to transfer the semikhah
title to future rabbis is often attributed to the fears that this
ordination destined them to bureaucratic and fiscal responsibilities;
particularly their Ottoman Administrative role to ensure the payments
of heavy tax as demanded of non-Muslim citizens of the Empire.
Preferring to leave these duties to others, the idea of an empowered
halakhic government of scholars with bureaucratic responsibilities
lost currency. The messianic formula of the sanhedrinists had too many
practical implications of governance and bureaucracy unsuitable to
their scholarly/pietistic leanings. The administrative realities of
their aspirations were too demanding and incongruous with their
personalities and one of the reasons that the initiative faded. Their
messianic doctrines would however be useful for later groups.

Secularism and Sabbateanism

It is indeed curious and unlikely to be coincidental that the same
Ottoman Empire that opened its arms to the expelled Jews of Spain and
the conversos of the inquisition should become the host to one of the
most fascinating examples of mass voluntary apostasy in Jewish
history. The Sultan was famed for welcoming the Jews saying: “Spain’s
loss was my gain”. They were integrated into society and enjoyed a
high degree of equality with the Muslim majority. It appears as no
coincidence that Sabbateanism emerged as Ottomanism was at its peak
and indeed it may be viewed in manways as an uniquely Ottoman
religion, adopting and drawing on local practices and myth, mannerisms
and language, drawing from the mysticism of the Turkish Sufi-Bektashi
order. The development of religious mannerisms and mythology to
complement and be complemented by the national motherland is a common
phenomenon and is seen also in Mormonism which also developed as a
homegrown religion adapting and developing Christian consensus to the
American condition. The Turkish nature of Sabbateanism may be
illustrated by the description of Sabetay Sevi during his visit to the
Sultan “dressed as a poor Turk” parading symbols of Islam, including a
green sash symbolic of the “Green Man” of Islam .

Even though we argue that Sabbateanism was working in the direction of
rationalism and secularism, without any doubt this was possible only
by extreme and dogmatic faith in its goals and belief in the
messiahship of Sevi. It appears that however “enlightened” the
eventual goals, it is accompanied by formative surges of pure faith,
to the extent of fanaticism, a dynamic which proves itself critical in
the formation of powerful social movements. The followers of Sabetay
Sevi were renowned for their intolerance of his detractors,
persecuting them and throwing them out of their towns. Dogmatic faith
in the principles of a group is demanded, at least of a hard core
group, as a guarantor of its survival. This is not an apologetic for
messianic fervour but an observation about some of the more harmonious
outcomes that may sprout from them after their period of consolidation
is complete. Restricting ourselves to Judaism we find that two of her
greatest secular-revivalist movements, Enlightenment and Secular
Zionism, show distinct messianic characteristics indicating its
ideological inspiration. In somewhat ironic contrast, the majority of
present-day Orthodox groups as well as a majority of the rightist
Settlement population in Israel show, contrary to popular belief,
distinct non-messianic signs and even contempt towards it, although
there are significant exceptions to this trend.

Sabbateanism and Zionism

Over the last decade many Israeli scholars and social commentators
have made the association between secular Zionism and messianism. No
less today than in the early days of its activities, secular Zionism
–
and the Israeli Left in particular – show distinctive utopian
aspirations that in many ways resemble forms of religious Jewish
messianism, oddly enough bolstered by an almost religious dogmatism.
Despite a declared and articulate opposition to conservative orthodoxy
and religious messianism, this group seems to have unconsciously
adopted many messianic characteristics and uses almost religious
symbolism to address its message. In contrast with the early Zionists
whose goal was a secular political messianism aimed at establishing a
political State and securing sovereign territory by force of arms as
an essential premise, the latter manifestation of the Israeli Left has
more mystical messianic leanings. On one hand the Israeli Left
acknowledges its national aspirations for Jewish sovereignty in the
Land of Israel, on the other it supports extreme territorial
compromise with Israel’s enemies. These two values are often perceived
to negate one another. In a situation which is quite possibly
un-resolvable in real-politick, it is however, considered entirely
possible – and likely – in the paradigm of peace that the Leftist
movement professes. Most interesting is the movement’s choice of
messianic terminology when describing the peace process with Israel’s
Arab neighbours, including; “new world order in the Middle East”, an
uncanny political rendition of the messianic “kingdom of heaven on
earth”. “Peace of the brave” is another term which incorporates two
messianic ideals, the common theme of peace that God will bless his
people with and the bravery required of the Warrior Messiah and his
soldiers fighting for redemption . Another common term is “sacrifices
for peace” referring to Israeli citizens killed in terrorist attacks
under Left Wing governments, while the government continued to defend
its pacifist policies arguing that it was all worth it as the nation
was on the verge of peace, the fallen being the necessary sacrifice.
Another term is “contractions” like that of a mother in childbirth,
which echo messianic terminology of the suffering before the messianic
age and evoking the religious significance of suffering in bringing
the messianic process to a head. “Just a bit more” is reference to
territory that many argue must be ceded to push the scales and bring
about peace with Israel’s neighbours. This resembles midrashic
analogies that ‘one extra deed can tip the scales’, and may bring
about the messianic times. Just as the ‘dwarf on the shoulders of a
giant’ offers that little bit more height to view into the messianic
age. “Just a bit more” money, deeds, action, or whatever the messianic
currency was, could tip the scales.

Whether the “Peace Now” campaigns of the Israeli left preceded the
“Moshiach Now” campaign of the Lubavitch movement is secondary to
their common inspiration for a messianic redemption. Both messianic
movements linked their dreams and desires in the little explored
concepts they enthusiastically extolled. Most interesting is the
extreme anti-nomian nature of the Israeli Left Wing. A new dimension
to anti-nomianism was created in this mutation of messianism that
extended beyond the rejection of Jewish ritual into a form of national
anti-nomianism. There existed an overwhelming pressure on believers
amongst the Israeli Left not only to neglect Jewish tradition but a
fundamental imperative to forfeit Jewish sovereignty particularly over
Jewish religious sites (Cave of Joseph, Cave of Machpela, Temple
Mount) by which peace was directly achievable. Furthermore, a curious
similarity between the Israeli Left and the Sabbatean movement is
illustrated in the Left’s strong public ties with Arabs and Islam
while privately rejecting and even despising their lifestyle, morality
and habits. Stark similarities are evident with the Donmeh who showed
great public affection with Islam but amongst themselves entirely
rejected and even despised Islam. This of course is not so much
because of causal influences that Sabbateanism had on Zionism but
rather because the same impulses and mechanisms active in both groups.
The belief that assimilation was an important utopian/messianic goal
is therefore argued to be a motivation in both Sabbatean and Left Wing
Zionist messianism. The difference between the theory and practice of
this ‘assimilation doctrine’ however is in the ability to carry the
process to untraceable ends and complete assimilation. Both the Donmeh
and the Israeli Left, despite their assimilatory ideals and not for
lack of trying, remained culturally unassimilated from their target
groups.

Ottoman Jews and Dönme Involvement in Zionism

It is difficult to show active Donme involvement in the history of the
Zionist movement. A certain amount of general Sabbatean sentiment
permeated the Zionist ethos though it is not entirely clear if there
was a direct link between the two and whether Sabbatean elements as an
entire group actively supported Zionism. It appears however that there
was sympathy. Sabbatean influence on Zionism was not necessarily
restricted to the Ottoman Empire, and while the Polish and German
Zionists could just as easily been Sabbatean inspired, this discussion
is lto Ottoman Sabbateanism. The proposition being that some Zionists
might have assumed that the Donme were more readily tolerant to their
cause than the Jewish community, and that they were kindred spirits
who shared so much common ethos was the single strongest motive for an
alliance.

Official Zionism came to Turkey after 1908, with the explicit purpose
of gaining Jewish community support to help establish a Jewish state
in Palestine. It built a network in Turkey to convince the new secular
Turkish regime of the importance of Zionism for their own cause . It
was believed the ruling Progress Party would see in Zionism an ally,
the shared secular aspirations, nationalism and geographic proximity
to one another were the foundations of this desired alliance. Zionists
worked on all these fronts. The Zionists sought to use the general
infighting within the Turkish Jewish community to gain a foothold of
their own. They courted both those disappointed with the dominant
French affiliated Alliance Israelite Universelle as well as those
disappointed with the conservative religious leadership.

The school system established by the Alliance Israelite Universelle to
advance Jewish culture in the spirit of the French revolution, opposed
Zionism for the same reasons that many Jews of the Enlightenment did;
it represented dual national interests. Benbassa points out that the
Alliance was less progressive than its local adherents were and many
supported it, lacking any other alternative. While the Alliance
leadership was opposed, there appears to have been a growing support
for Zionism, particularly amongst the ranks of students emerging from
these schools, among them many Donme.

The power structures of Ottoman Jewish communities were elaborate,
with the conservative structures and rabbinic councils and the “Haham
Basi” (chief rabbinate in Istanbul) being threatened by the Alliance.
The traditional leadership had tense relations with Zionist elements
about community authority in the Holy Land. The millet structure gave
the Haham Basi authority which the new settlers in Palestine rejected.
It reached a degree where the Haham Basi of Jerusalem – Raphael
Efendi
- complained to the Turkish Foreign Minister that the Ashkenazi Jews
of the Holy Land were not obeying the laws of the Jewish community and
the millet community structure over which he lorded. Differences were
not only the result of ethnic, Ashkenazi-Sephardi mores but because
the immigrants to the Holy Land were shedding religious observance
altogether in favour of socialism and secularism. Despite attempts to
work with them, including Herzl’s twice successful appeal to Haham
Basi – Moshe Levi - to get an audience with the Sultan (1902) to
discuss the question of Jewish autonomy in Palestine, the relationship
soured.

It is curious that Israel’s first and second Prime Ministers, David
Ben Gurion and Moshe Sharett and her second president Yitzchak Ben Zvi
had lived and studied in Istanbul and embraced the concept
“lehitatmen”, Hebrew for “to become an Ottoman”. Ben Zvi is alleged by
some to be descendent of a Sabbatean family . Sharett served in the
Ottoman army in WW1. Ben Gurion gave up Russian citizenship for
Ottoman citizenship, something many others in Palestine were afraid to
do. Israeli Presidents Ben Zvi, Zalman Shazar and to a lesser degree
Yitzchak Navon became students of Ottomanism. The first two undertook
research and wrote important works on Sabbateanism, indicating that
the subject touched a nerve with their own identities as Jews who were
deeply attached to their traditions, possessing messianic – Zionist
aspirations but not religiously observant. For many, the
identification, study and sympathy towards Sabbateanism permitted them
a connection with Jewish history, doctrine and the aspirations for
national renaissance without ritual commitment. In many ways this
resembled what has often been said of the study of Jewish
historiography popularised in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The study of Jewish history instead of the practise of religious
ritual allowed enlightened Jews to attach themselves to the Jewish
nation while not compromising their rejection of religious doctrine.
The same may be said of the study of Sabbateanism and in this respect
it ranks as an important source of inspiration for secular Zionism.

For these reasons it follows that Zionism’s secular nature indicated a
potential for its proponents to develop a strong fraternity with
Sabbatean elements or an affinity with its system of ideas greater
than with mainstream Jewish religion. But clearly, open relationships
with the Donme would have entirely alienated orthodox support for
Zionism and in this respect if it existed, it must have been kept
secret.

Jews, Dönme and the Young Turk Revolution

On the face of it, participation of Ottoman Jewry in the Young Turk
revolution seems like an instinctive thing for a minority to do. It
was a way to ensure equality and complete integration into the
national structures of Turkey, without discrimination on the basis of
religion or ethnicity. A similar process occurred amongst the
Palestinian Christians of the same period who supported the
Pan-Arabian – Baath party uniting around a secular, non-Islamic
national agenda which embraced all Arabs, regardless of religious
inclinations . But the Jews and the Donme were the only minorities to
support the Young Turk initiative and did so in high numbers with
astounding loyalty and success, while the Armenians and Greeks of the
Empire chose to dissent. This raises the possibility that more
profound reasons were uniquely at play in Jewish political thinking.
Feroz Ahmad argued that because Jews, unlike Christian minorities did
not enjoy foreign protection, they wholeheartedly put their destiny in
with the Union and Progress Party. The Donme therefore, as an entirely
Turkish phenomenon and more isolated than the Jews, with no
international support, would more easily throw in their destiny with
the Progress Party. Both feared annexation to a Christian controlled
Greece, preferring Islam and a secular Turkish State . This arguably
also taps into latent Sabbatean doctrine and its deep attachment to
Turkish culture, secularism, assimilation and a desire to see their
messianic doctrines defined within the national renaissance of Turkey.

The Ottoman Empire included a mixed stock of Italians, Greeks, Serbs,
Croats, Albanians, Circassians, Georgians, Armenians and Jews; local
and immigrants. This internationalism was reinforced by the habit of
the Ottoman sovereigns to marry only with foreign women. Desirable and
intelligent technicians were imported or co-opted into administrative
and military ranks provided they accepted Islam or they were collected
from the Balkans at the age of eight and raised as Muslims in special
schools and prepared for all sorts of official ranks. This climate was
convenient for people of Sabbatean origin and facilitated their
integration in Ottoman society without being unduly noticed. But while
others assimilated quickly, the Sabbatean – Donme preserved their
community structures, becoming a force to be reckoned in economics and
politics until the population transfer of all Turks (including Donmes)
from Salonica to Istanbul in 1924, where the community again became
less public. With the course of WWII and after the death of Ataturk,
the Turkish establishment was influenced by Hitler’s racial theories.
A special wealth tax law was enacted. In practice, non-Moslem
minorities (Jews, Armenians, Greeks) were arbitrarily taxed and even
the Donme, to a lesser extent, were identified for taxation purposes .
From that date onwards, the emerging Islamic fundamentalist elements
contested the Donme’s identity as Turks. The religious press attacked
the Republic, its founder Ataturk, and the secular nature of the
regime. They never forgave the Donme for their role in the secular
revolution and they became a convenient target for hatred. Over the
last sixty years it is this hatred and racist rhetoric in the guise of
Arab nationalism which constantly reminded Sabbateans of their racial
heritage, otherwise complete asinto secular Islam might have been
possible.

Other slurs made against the Donme at this time both indicate their
problems of self-identity and the degree to which their influence in
the Young Turk revolution was felt. Baer describes this in an
important review of a recent work by Donme activist Ilgaz Zorlu “Yes,
I am a Salonican” claiming significant Donme secret life in
present-day Turkey. While vehemently denied by modern Donmeh
proponents, the issues raised in this and other works, indicating the
extent of Donme influence in Modern Turkey, has caused fierce
criticism from Islamists comparable to the period in the early part of
the century when the Donme were the focus of large public scrutiny and
criticism .

In 1924 a Donme from Salonica named Karaka Mehmed Rufltu wrote an
expose of his community to the Grand National accusing 10-15000 Donme
of acting like Muslims in public but secretly maintaining their own
rituals. He accused them of unwillingness to sacrifice for their
country and being parasites off the country. He argued that the Donme
must assimilate and marry with other Turks and share all aspects of
the fatherland or leave Turkey. In a ten part rebuttal to these claims
called “A Mysterious Page of History” published in the paper “Vatan”
it was described how assimilated the Donme were and how willing they
were to become a part of Turkish life.

The extent to which Jews were involved in the Young Turk revolution is
debated, some arguing that Jews and Donme dominated the Committee of
the Union and Progress Party (C.U.P) which gained control of the State
. Others argue that this was anti-Semitic rhetoric and exaggerated and
that while the Jews supported the revolution on a grass roots level,
they were not highly represented in the upper echelons of the party .
Indeed British diplomats did report to the home office that a
Jewish-Masonic conspiracy was at work favouring the revolution . The
Donme are believed to have been equally involved in the revolution but
exact details are less known due to a number of reasons. Many Donme
were cursorily described as Jews by observers lacking an appreciation
for the subtleties of the two communities. The general secrecy of the
community and its increased secrecy after WWII and the threats of
Islamic fundamentalism, peppered with assimilation trends and extreme
secularism, makes documentation difficult. The fear of reprisal by
fundamentalist groups in Modern Turkey has left the remnants of Donme
communities less willing to testify to their role in the revolution.
Rumours were always extant that key activists in the revolution were
of Donme stock; even Ataturk was alleged by some to have Donme
ancestry . It was via the Masonic lodges that the Donme, the Jews,
Bektashi and secularists who were less accepted in mainstream society
were able to meet on an equal footing, many of them becoming major
instruments of the revolution.

Salonica was a nest of revolutionary sentiments and home to its major
figures. It is no coincidence that it was also home to the strongest
Donme and most vibrant Jewish community of the Empire. Coopermans’
description is apt: “Salonica afforded an eclectic and often, but not
exclusively, cosmopolitan environment where Dervis sects crossed paths
with the Donme, where Jewish and Turkish businesses were interspersed
on the same streets, and where commercial and municipal courts were
mixed. Here, where the Jewish Masonic organizations supported the
creation of Muslim – Turkish lodges, and where Muslim – Turkish
newspapers supported the election of Jewish municipal assembly
candidates, was the source the combination of inter-communal energies
which gave the revolution of 1908 its impetus” . The Donme served as a
bridge between the Jewish community and the Turks which made winners
all-round, improving the Jewish position, helping the revolution and
bringing the Donme back to a degree of acceptance amongst Jews . Their
assimilationist attitude had won them equal footing with Muslims as
well as opportunities to make inroads into public life without being
marked or discriminated as a Jew. Their educational doctrine was
conducive to public works and revolutionary activity. They must have
seen this period as a window of opportunity, their accounts of them
becoming less secretive and more publicly minded. The Great Mosque
(Yeni Camii) built by the Donme in Salonica in 1903 was a public face
of loyalty to Islam. Whether indicating that they no longer needed to
worship in secret because their Jewish rites were less important than
in the past is a subject of discussion, but secrecy was becoming less
characterisitc . The Donme have been described as “full of ardour for
action …at the avant-garde of civilisation …ideas of justice and
progress” . Mehmet Cavit Bey (1875-1926) was one of the most
significant Donme political figures. He was active in the revolution
as a highly articulate editor of a tabloid and professor of finance
and was three times Finance Minister of Modern Turkey until his
execution for his alleged role in the assassination attempt of Ataturk
. It is believed that Cavit Bey was an ardent Zionist and saw the
advantages for Turkey in the Jewish settlement of Palestine . Articles
appeared that showed ardent support both for the Turc revolution and
Zionism, as if part of the same process . Revolutionary activists Leon
Gattegno and a Donme friend Mazlum Hakki, published a journal in Paris
entitled “Resad” under the pseudonym of “sucro” and sent it to the
great powers, condemning the Sultan’s government . In an article in
the C.U.P journal “Mechveret Suppliment Francais” the Donme were
mentioned to be the only group in Salonica active on behalf of the
C.U.P and the revolution . Another article describes the Donme as one
of the most modernised groups in the empire . According to Pukru
Haniolu, about five people appear active in the Salonican branch of
the C.U.P. Two were Jewish and two of possible Donme descent. Emmanuel
Karasu was Grand Master of the Macedonia Risorta Masonic Lodge and
invited Muslims and Donme to join the lodges of the Empire sheltering
them and providing them with a framework to disseminate their ideas.
Avram Galante was a writer and participated in the Second Turk
Congress in Paris in 1907. Ferdinand Efendi, an Ottoman of Greek
descent and possibly Donme. A man called Archbolo whose ethnic descent
is unknown, and another who had a Muslim name but might also have been
Donme . Dr Nazim, Nuzhet Faik, Mustafa Arif, Muslihiddin Adil, Sukru
Bleda, Halide Edip Adivar and Ahmet Emin Yalman were all active in the
Young Turks and of Donme families. Mehmet Kapanci (1839-1924) who was
a mayor of Salonica and a well-known banker funded the C.U.P and was a
Donme. Other Jews active in the Young Turks were Nissim Mazliah from
Izmir and Vitali Faradji , Moise Cohen (later called Munis Tekinalp)
who was an active Jew and once rabbinical student who turned to
business and actively asserted a proud Turkish identity along with
Zionist sentiments. Other Jews and Donme served as ranking officers in
the Turkish army. Jews had always been represented in Ottoman
parliaments but there had been a significant rise after the revolution
reflecting their degree of participation .

Unable to work together in their respective religious environments,
The Jews and Donme appeared to have met and fraternised within the
Masonic lodge. Because of the rigid initiation rites the fear of
espionage by the Sultan was less in such an environment and it was
here that revolutionary sentiments and activity fermented. Whether the
suspicions that Masonry is responsible for sedition and subversive
activities are true or not, in this context they were a convenient
home for the revolution, providing lodges and personnel, secrecy and
structures for the revolution. The Donme thrived in the Masonic
environment, allowing them to be both secretive and influential,
maintaining their religious ideas in a non-dogmatic atmosphere.
Bridging the gap between the Jews and the Muslims, they seemed to
represent the happy medium of the secular Young Turk revolution. Even
today Donme are involved in the Masonic Lodof Turkey. Sahir Talat Akev
of the Kapanci-Izmir group of Donme was the Grand Master of the Masons
until his death in 1999.

In Salonica of 1879 the Kapanci Donme set up a private school system
called “Terakki Mektebi” (”progress” named after the revolutionary
“Progress Party” and suggesting the strong share of its ethos) which
became a model for other private schools in Turkey. It was transferred
to Istanbul after the population transfer and has become one of the
best- known private high schools (called Sisli Terakki Lisesi).
Similarly, the Karakash Donme founded the Fevziye Mektebi School and
recently founded a university by the name of Isik Universitesi.

It comes as no surprise that the Donme are today blamed by Islamic
fundamentalists in Turkey for the secular revolution and spurned with
hatred as being a group that infiltrated its way into Islam in order
to destroy it. The ‘prosperity party’ representing these views in
Turkish parliament have also fiercely attacked Israel. They got 22% of
the vote in 1996 becoming the largest single political party. They
were shut down by the constitutional court of Turkey but re-emerged as
the ‘Virtue Party’ which got 17% of the vote in 1999. Considering its
Islamic heritage and the environment of Arab hatred for Israel, it is
remarkable that Turkey has fostered such strong ties with Israel and
the causes for it may well be traced to the Donme influence.

Donme members today represent the elite of society within Turkey and
it is the fear of being discovered that created the intense secrecy
around them. Their increased secrecy and influence continues to
circularly feed the hatred and suspicion surrounding them.

At present there are some well-known Donme families and other less
known families occupying important positions in Modern Turkish life.
The current Foreign Minister Mr. Ismail Cem is a Donme though some of
his family members have officially come out and declared that although
they are of Donme ethnicity they disassociate from the cultural group
. These include relatives: Cepil Ipekci, a famous fashion designer in
Turkey and Nukhet Izet Ipekci, daughter of the famous journalist Abdi
Ipekci, who declared on an Islamic channel that her parents were of
Donmeh origins . Others such as the industrialists; the Dilber and
Bezmen families are Donme. Rahsan Ecevit, wife of Prime Minister
Bilent Ecevit is a Donme. First ever, female Prime Minister Tansu
Ciller is half Donme on her mother’s side. Altan Oymen, past leader of
the Republican People’s Party was of Donme descent. Other prominent
personalities ranging from well known writers, journalists, film
makers, professors, lawyers, judges, bureaucrats (legal and foreign
service), bankers, industrialists are of Donme origin. They can almost
be said to be the standard bearers of secularism and modern Turkish
nationalism that is based on cultural unity rather than racial
characteristics. They are more advanced in this process than secular
Turkish Jews and in many ways resemble the prominence and thinking of
the European Jewish Enlightenment leading many to suspect that
Sabbateanism played a role there too. Donme sympathy towards Jews
exists but association is not common because of the fears of being
further tainted by Islamic fundamentalism. This fear is becoming
increasingly real as the Islamic party grows.

Modern Turkey’s Relations with Israel

Modern Turkey has been unusually friendly in its relationship with
Israel, in contrast to other Islamic states. This is especially unique
as it is a key country in the region and had to resist strong
neighbouring Islamic pressures to do so. While Gruen argues that it
did so because it believed that suthe emergent Israeli state would be
a stabilising factor in the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder if
it reflected the attitude of a country influenced by its famous Jewish
sectarian group, the Donme.

Immediately after Israel’s independence, Turkey signed a postal
agreement with Israel, forbade any Turkish citizens from joining the
war for or against Israel and on the 15 September 1948 the Turkish
government lifted the ban on travelling to Israel, allowing any
Turkish citizen to immigrate there. It co-operated with the Jewish
Agency to facilitate Jewish immigration and half the Jewish population
of approximately 50,000 people left creating a 100,000 strong Turkish
Jewish population in Israel today. Turkey was a member of the
commission for Palestinian conciliation and as an Islamic country was
expected to take an anti-Israel position. Under the representation of
the intellectual Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, Turkey proved to be very
supportive of the fledgling State. Yalcin had been friendly with Ben
Gurion and there are many reasons to believe that his intellectual
background brought him into contact with many Jews and Donme of
Turkey. That he became the step-father of Mehmet Cavit Bey’s son Siar
Yalcin after Bey’s execution in 1926 leads us to seriously suppose
that his connections with the Donme were stronger than is publicly
known. His initial concern with supporting Israel had been that Israel
represented foreign interests in the region, those fears were allayed,
and Turkey formally recognised the State of Israel on 28th March 1949,
embassies, trade and direct flights followed. Certainly Turkey felt
that it had much to gain by supporting Israel. By supporting Israel
and the Jewish state they showed themselves to the world as supporters
of secularism and enlightenment. The perception that Jews were
powerful and influential both in Turkey and the U.S reigned. The
agreement was signed only a few days before the Turkish foreign
minister met with American President Truman, who himself supported the
partition plan of Palestine and was helped by many Jews. The
appointment of Henry Morgenthau, a Jewish – American as ambassador in
Turkey, during the early part of the century had reinforced this
perception.

Israel’s relations with Turkey were not always smooth and not always
public. Pressure from Arab countries forced it to greater discretion.
Ben Gurion described the relationship as one with a mistress and not
an open relationship. The Turkish continued the metaphor that ‘a man
may love his mistress more than his wife, but appearances have to be
kept up’ noting that ‘the Arab wife brings with it a large dowry ‘
making reference to trade and oil.

By the 1990’s 60,000 Israeli tourists per year travelled to Turkey and
this has risen even higher since. There are academic, intelligence and
military exchanges and a strong strategic alliance is in place.

Conclusion

The remnants of the Dönme have few overt messianic signs. Few go any
longer to the seashore raising their hands and calling out in Spanish
“Sabatey Sabetay we await thee”. They are predominantly secular and
liberal and highly assimilated. They are predominantly atheist and at
best only culturally Sabbatean. Whether the mystical designs of
Sabbatean doctrine intended to form such a community is secondary to
the fact that mystical doctrine outside of a protected environment
contains highly liberal characteristics. As a group, the Dönme
assimilated, leaving only a shadow of their doctrinal selves.
Sabbateanism, despite its mystical nature and its roots in
sectarianism sowed the seeds of tolerance, assimilation,
interpretation, anti-fundamentalis and universalism within Judaism and
in wider circles and in so doing was a proto-secular group,
instrumental in laying down the ideological infrastructure for other
Jewish groups to follow.

It is clear that messianism changes form and has moved from working
within religious frameworks to working within highly secular
frameworks. With this in mind the messianic tendencies of secular and
political groups can be better understood, as can be an appreciation
of their ideological architecture.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baer, Marc David, “Revealing a Hidden Community: Ilgaz Zorlu and the
Debate in Turkey over the Donme/Sabbateans” The Turkish Studies
Association, Vol 23, Spring 1999 1, pp 68-75.

Barnai, Jacob, “The Spread of the Sabbatean Movement in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries”, Communication in the JDiaspora
the Pre-Modern World. Ed. by Sophia Menachem. (Leiden, 1996) 313-337

Barnai, Jacob, “Messianism and Leadership; the Sabbatean Movement and
the Leadership of the Jewish Communities the Ottoman Empire”, Ottoman
and Turkish Jewry; Community and Leadership. Ed. by Aron Rodrigue.
(Bloomington, 1992), 167-182

Barnai, Jacob, “From Sabbateanism to Modernization; Ottoman Jewry on
the eve of the Ottoman Reforms and the Haskala”, in Sephardi and
Middle Eastern Jewries; History and Culture in the Modern Era. Ed. By
Harvey E. Goldberg. (Bloomington,1996) 73-80

Jacob Barnai, “The Outbreak of Sabbateanism – The Eastern European
Factor”, The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Vol 4 pp
171-183

Carlebach, Elisheva, “Sabbatianism and the Jewish-Christian Polemic”,
World Congress of Jewish Studies (WCJS) 10,C2 (Jerusalem, 1990) 1-7

Idel, Moshe, “Saturn and Sabbetai Tzevi: a New Approach to
Sabbateanism” in Jewish Studies 37 (Jerusalem, 1997) pp 147-160.

Katz, Jacob, “The Suggested Relationship between Sabbatianism,
Haskalah, and Reform”, Divine Law in Human Hands (Jerusalem, 199
504-530

Katz, Jacob, Divine Law in Human Hands; Case Studies in Halakhic
Flexibility, (Jerusalem, 199

Katz, Yossef, “Paths of ZioniPolitical Action in Turkey, 1882-1914;
the plan for Jewish settlement in Turkey in the Young Turks era”,
International Journal of Turkish Studies 4,1 (1987) 115-135

Kushner, David, “Mustafa Kemal and his period in the eyes of the
Hebrew press and publications in Palestine”, International Journal of
Turkish Studies 3,2 (1985-1986) 95-106

Liebes, Yehuda, “Sabbatean messianism”, Studies in Jewish Myth and
Jewish Messianism (Albany, 1993) 93-106, 177-182

Stavroulaki, Nikos, “Shabbetai Zevi and the “Donme” of Thessaloniki”,
Forum on the Jewish People, Zionism and Israel 53. (Jerusalem,1984)
103-114

Zorlu Ilgaz, Evet Ben Selaniklyim (Yes, I am a Salonican), (Istanbul,
199

7 Days (Hebrew weekly) 20-5-1999

Jerusalem (Hebrew Local Weekly) 22-3-96

——————————————————————————————————-
1. My thanks are due to Denis Ojalvo from Istanbul and to Donme
activists Ilgaz Zorlu and B. Selim Iz for their interesting thoughts
and references. Thanks to Dr Gad Nasi of the Turkish Community in
Israel and Yuri Yomtov for their bibliographical suggestions.
Appreciation to Yakov Leib, moderator and teacher of the Donme West
Web Site who, through his efforts to disseminate Sabbatean teachings
provides information and important archives as well as a platform for
lay-people and academics alike to study Sabbatean and ‘neo-Sabbatean’
subjects.
2. See Gershom Scholem, Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah, 1626-1676
(Princeton, 1976) and Jacob Katz, “The Suggested Relationship between
Sabbatianism, Haskalah, and Reform”, Divine Law in Human Hands
(Jerusalem, 199 504-530.
3. The extent of their assimilatory nature is arguable, its existence
to some degree is not. Haskalla advocated various forms of cultural
assimilation, the Reform movement advocated religious and liturgical
assimilation and Zionism advocated varying forms of national
assimilation.
4. The well documented “witch hunts” after secret Sabbateans and the
repression of Sabbatean influence is the best evidence that their
doctrine was felt and feared amongst the traditional Jewish
communities.
5. In personal communications with Turkish Donme.
6. Islam traditionally does not put into question the sincerity of
converts “those who call anyone who makes hadith an unbeliever is
himself an unbeliever. Considering that there is no notion of
insincere conversion in Islam, it is surprising that the Donme should
be considered or be called Islamic unbelievers and perhaps the name
refers to their heresy of Judaism.
7. The Millet System of minority religious autonomy was the
application of the dhimma contract prescribed in the Quran to protect
the ‘people of the book’ (dhimmi). In many ways it was superior to any
other method employed by Christian civilisation in the East or West.
It was an enlightened means of preserving the identity of minority
groups and securing their religious liberties. It allowed Jews,
Catholics and Orthodox Christianity to ensure their distinctions and
preserved the uniqueness of various Orthodox sects yet it appears not
to have been as sensitive to sub-divisions within all religious groups
and left room for some frustration.
8. The following is part of a personal communication with a member of
a Donme community in Istanbul. He denies of allegations of wife
swapping “…Although Muslim fundamentalists will say everything that
is
offensive against the Donme they never say a word about ‘wife swapping
bastards’. Even they believe that this is a shameless slander. I can’t
help wonder why the Jews can’t think of anything else except wife
swapping orgies when it comes to the Donme. Do allegations
miraculously turn true when many people start believing in them? Then
are we to believe in the blood libels and the Protocols of the Elders
of Zion because millions of people believe that these are historical
facts. How absurd. This is nonsense. It was born from sectarian
hatred. The descendants of the Donme will not be ashamed of their
heritage because a couple of Jewish academicians want them to be (e.g.
Gershom Scholem)…”. (Name withheld for privacy).
9. Bektashi and other Shias preached equality of the sexes prior to
Sababteanism, indicating either causal influence on Sabbateanism or
similar processes occurring among them.
10.At the “feast of the lamb” an orgy allegedly takes place, offspring
of which are considered to be holy children despite rabbinic
insistence that they are bastards born of adultery. The theology of
the bastard is fascinating and reflects many issues of mysticism and
the breaking with traditional models of family and group hierarchy out
of which the messiah is expected to emerge. This practice might also
be connected to, and in some way be a response to, the problems of
‘agunot’, (Hebrew for “chained women”) whose husbands were feared
dead, but Jewish law still prohibited wives from remarrying until the
death had been substantiated by two eyewitnesses. In the wake of
pogroms and waves of escaping refugees, eyewitnessing a death was not
likely and caused difficult problems for wives. Sabbatean practice
found a solution for this difficulty by legitimising a form of ritual
adultery and thereby ridding themselves of a legal difficulty with the
“chained women” that halakhah had no solution for. Perhaps this
Sabbatean ritual, if true, developed as a response to the “agunot”
crisis.
11. The Tanzimat reforms of the 1840s in Turkey were designed in part
to allow Albanian Catholics freedom to worship publicly but at the
same time it reduced pressures on Sabbatean Jews who professed a
desire to resume public Judaism.
12. See Jacob Barnai, “The Outbreak of Sabbateanism – The Eastern
European Factor”, The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Vol 4
pp 171-183. He argues that the 30 year war between 1618-1648 created a
flood of Jewish refugees from Eastern/Central Europe to Western Europe
including Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, Holland and England. He
argues that in Amsterdam these refugees met Marranos “saturated by
messianic tension” and were influenced by them and also by Christian
doctrine. Amongst them was R’ Heschel Zoref of Vilna, who after
returning to Poland, was one of the chief prophets of Sabetay Sevi. He
also connects Jewish messianic groups with Christian messianic
predictions around the year 1648. He quotes the work of Richard H.
Popkin “Rabbi Nathan Shapira’s Visit to Amsterdam” in Dutch Jewish
History, and Christian millenarians publications in London predicting
the redemption and the liberation of the Jews in 1658. This connection
needs further study.
13. Selahattin Ulkumen, The Turkish Consul-General of Rhodes during
the Second World War was alleged to be a Donme. He interceded to save
42 Jewish families of Turkish nationality from deportation to
Auschwitz. He was honoured as a “Righteous Gentile” by Yad Va-Shem in
1990.
14. On the first page of his introduction to his book “Ez Haim”,
(Hakdmat MoHRH”V al Shar ha-Hakdamot) Haim Vital calculates how the
Messiah should have come and has not and that all efforts to bring him
have failed. He blames this failure on the false understanding of
certain religious scholars. In the proceedings he argues how a
mystical understanding of Jewish law is essential to the redemptive
process and that a purely halakhic approach is damaging and
counterproductive. His language is fierce and critical of the dry
halakhists who do not understand the Kabbalah “they have brought the
exit of the Divine Presence from the world”. This criticism is
arguably directed at the group led by R’ Jacob Berab, which sought to
re-establish the Sanhedrin and bring about the redemptive process,
based on halakhic and political grounds. The causal relationship
between the failure of this group and the subsequent strengthening of
mystical messianism and Lurianic Kabbalah becomes increasingly
evident.
15. Personal correspondence with Stephen Schwartz, a writer and
researcher on religion in Kosovo. Schwartz has taken a particular
interest in the relationship between Bektashism and Sabbateanism in
Kosovo and the region.
16. See Donme West Website, the debate between Prof Avraham Elkayam
and Stephen Schwartz on this subject is around whether Sevi was
influenced by Bektashism before his conversion or only afterwards.
17. The most important Sabbatean sympathiser with Bektashiism was
Mehmet Esad Dede (1841-1913) of the Izmirli Donme group. He wrote
books and poems which offer insight into the Sabbatean – Bektashi
relationship.
18. Many messianic sects are typically socially active within their
communities and have a strong work ethic. Jewish Messianic groups such
as Chabad are proactive, capable administrators and economically
aggressive. This certainly strengthens the messianic unit, the
motivations to join it and the sense of accomplishment that adherents
derive from membership.
19. See Stanford J Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the
Turkish Republic, p.136
20. Likewise, even before his apostasy to Islam, Sabetay Sevi
symbolically did the same by reciting a benediction over heleb (the
forbidden fat of the lamb’s kidney) “Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who
makes the forbidden things permissible” and caused ten Israelites to
ritually eat it, a practice which allegedly remains in force among the
Turkish Sabbateans this day.
21. See Avner Levi, “Shavat Aniim: Social Cleavage, Class War and
Leadership in the Sephardi Community – the Case of Izmir 1847″. In
Ottoman and Turkish Jewry, Eds Aron Rodrigue, (Indiana, 1992).
22. See Meir Benayahu, The Shabbatean Movement in Greece, (Hebrew),
(Jerusalem, 1973). He describes the support of many for Kabbalistic
writings, including Rabbi David di Medinah (p 183) who wrote praising
the increased publishing of kabbalistic and hidden texts.
23. Haim Vital and other Kabbalists describe their stopovers in
Salonica and infer its deep attachment to Kabbalah and esoteric
studies. Many kabbalistic texts were published there including various
manuscripts see for example Emek ve-Shalom, Mizrachi Sharabi,
(Salonika 1796).
24. Cooperman, Eugene, 1992, Turko-Jewish Relations in the Ottoman
City of Salonica (1889-1912) Ph.D dissertation (NYU, 1992).
25. Joseph Karo, for reasons unknown, was not accepted into Lurie’s
study circle but was nevertheless a student of Kabbalah. Study of his
personality and how he was interested both in what we call political
messianism and mysticism at once, is an important key to a better
understanding of these events.
26. See Jacob Katz “Vikuch al ha-Semikhah” Zion 27
27. See A.L Friedman Le-maan Zion: Two Letters on Renewing the
Sanhedrin, (Hebrew) (New York, 1911) p 4. He blames those who refused
to energise the ordination of rabbis and renew the Sanhedrin with the
heresies that followed. He makes an analogy that plays on the two
functions of “semikhah” (literally meaning to “lay hands”). In ancient
Israel it was performed on two occasions, to anoint a leader or to
anoint an animal for the Temple sacrifice. He argued that because the
Jews refused to accept their responsibilities and anoint their leaders
to redeem them, they are paying for it and have become the sacrificial
animals anointed to be sacrificed for their sin.
28. See, for example, the following rabbinic quote “And the Holy One,
blessed be He, will expound the meanings of a new Torah which He will
give them through the Messiah.” (Aleph-Bait di R. Akiba, BhM 3:27-29).
“R. Hizqiya in the name of R. Simon bar Zibdi said: ‘The whole Torah
which you learn in This World is vanity compared to the Torah of the
World to Come.” (Eccl. Rab. 11:1). “The Messiah will sit in the
supernal House of Study and all those who walk on earth will come and
sit before him to hear a new Torah and new Commandments.” (Yemenite
Midrash pp. 349-50). “Zerubbabel and Elijah will come in the Messianic
age and explain and expound all the secrets of Torah and all that
which is crooked and distorted.” (Halakhot G’dolot p. 223)
29. Reference to Holy men wearing a green sash appear in other
religious writings see, for example, Aaron Zvi Eshkoli, Rabbi Haim
Vital; Sefer Hizionot, (Hebrew) (Jerusalem,1954). Vital recounts
various visions where semi messianic or holy characters are wearing
the green sash. Perhaps these portrayals are indicative of a more
profound association.
30. Although Sabetay Sevi was obviously not a warrior there were many
rumours that spread in his life time that he had been enlisted by the
Sultan to lead troops to conquer Poland and Germany. See Barnai p.181
quoting R’ Jacob Sasportas “And now the liars have become aroused to
write more stories, that the Sultan made him his commander in chief
and sent him with 200,000 men to war in Poland to fulfill the prophecy
of the Devil (Nathan) the Ashkenazi of Gaza, who said he would avenge
those who were killed in Poland”.
31. See Esther Benbassa, “Zionism and the Politics of Coalitions”, in
Ottoman and Turkish Jewry, eds Aron Rodrigue, (Indiana, 1992)
32. See article in “7 days” (Hebrew weekly) of the 20-5-99.
33. This subject is addressed in my article entitled “Arab
Christianity and Zionism” (forthcoming).
34. The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, eds Avigdor Levi, Washington, 1994,
Jewish representation in the Ottoman parliaments by Hasan Kayal pp
507-517
35. See Walter F. Weiker, Ottomans, Turks and the Jewish Polity,
(Jerusalem , 1992) p 250 describes the “Varlk Vergisi” tax levy that
all non-Muslims and foreigners were charged. The Donme had their own
tax schedule in distinction from Muslims and although it was not as
high it reflected an official distinction.
36. See Baer, Marc David, “Revealing a Hidden Community: Ilgaz Zorlu
and the Debate in Turkey over the Donme/Sabbateans” The Turkish
Studies Association, Vol 23, Spring 1999 1, pp 68-75 discuses the
Zorlu controversy.
37. See Eli Kedourie, Young Turcs, Freemasons and Jews (1977) pp
243-63.
38. See Eugene Cooperman, “The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the
Jewish Community of Salonica” in Studies on Turkish-Jewish History,
eds. David Altabe,Erhan Atay, Israel Katz, (New York, 1996). Ahmad and
Lewis disagree arguing that Jews were not in the upper echelons of the
C.U.P.
39. See Kedourie
40. Although this is likely confused with his attendance at a school
governed by Donme and his first teacher Semsi Efendi was an active
Donme, who tried to unite the three strands of the sect. Although
Ataturk’s father was a Turkish speaking Albanian and his mother a
Pomak – Slavic Macedonian Muslim he was sent to study with the
Donmeh.
Ataturk himself describes in an important speech “Nutuk” that he was
sent to study under Semsi Efendi – in the most progressive school of
the day.
41. Cooperman p 176.
42. Cooperman
43. The Russian author Vladmir Gordevsky writes as early as 1926 p.
200 how the Donme were becoming politically active in Salonica. As
this occurred after the revolution they clearly felt that they were
vidicated and had rights that need not be left secret.
44. Slousch 1908: 495
45. He was since found guiltless.
46. Aryeh Shmuelevitz, Ottoman History and Society – Jewish Sources,
(Istanbul, 1999), pp 73-87.
47. Two Hebrew weeklies supported both Zionism and the Young Turks the
first was “Hamevasser” 1910-1911 published in Istanbul and “Haverenu”
published in Izmir in 1922.
48. Pukru Haniolu, “Jews in the Young Turk Movement to the 1908
Revolution”, in The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, Eds Avigdor Levi
Washington, 1994. 519-526
49. See “Vilayetlerimiz” in Mechveret, no 15, 23 July, 1896, p 3.
50. See Hak-Gu, “Selanik’den Mektub,” in Mechveret, no 15, 23 July,
1896 p 4 as quoted in Pukru Haniolu, p.522).
51. See Pukru Haniolu, 522
52. See Hasan Kayal, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, eds Avigdor Levi
(Washington, 1994) 507-517
53. Ex-Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos gave an interview to
the Greek Eleftherotypia Newspaper (17 December 2000) declaring Ismail
Cem not to be a pure Turk but a Salonici Donme. He said that the
foreign ministry of Turkey was in the hands of those whose races were
different. Most of the Foreign Ministers of the Turkish Republic have
in fact been of Donme origin.
54. Channel 7 on the 22nd of September 2000
55. See George E. Gruen, “Turkey’s Relations with Israel: From
Ambivalence to Open Cooperation”, 112-129 in Studies on Turkish-Jewish
History.